Based on seven months of fieldwork research, the present article explores the nature and 'reach' of the state in post-genocide Rwanda, and its effects on decentralisation, participation and assertion of voice at the local level. Rwanda as a case of a 'strong' African state is explored through a number of lenses: the vertical structure (administrative and information apparatuses of the state); the lateral structure (multiple responsibilities, imihigo, indirect control); the spectrum of state-led 'local' activities; and last but not least, the 'counterweights' to the state. The article suggests an increasing penetration of state in terms of surveillance as well as exactions (couched in terms of umusanzu or contribution) and control over voice at local level. Decentralisation amounts to mere 'dispatching of control', making central power more, not less, effective.
join, they would be labelled as subversives, as supporters of 'divisionist' parties, or as those who refuse to 'build the country together' (ibid.). People are pressured in a more indirect way too:
At the local level, the authorities were going from house to house handing out forms … [asking for] name, and then there was a question 'When did you join the umuryango?' What do you mean? I joined my family when I was born [laughing] … no, the political umuryango, they meant ishaka by it, the party. It is called umuryango because it should be a 'family for everyone' … You see, it is a demagogic approach. It is tricky, because they ask them [the people they visit] 'Why don't you participate in government programmes?' What do you mean, but this is not national programme, this is RPF! 21 Membership in the 'political family' literally comes with a price. Rwanda is not only a new land of fines, it is a land of 'exactions' couched in the language of 'contributions' (umusanzu). Raising money and other resources (such as labour) in the community is a changing but ancient practice, and is done on small scale everywhere. However, the notion of 'contribution' in Rwanda has been hijacked by the state and transformed into multiple exactions such as umuganda contributions (in form of labour), or icyunamo (mourning period) contributions (in form of cash). While non-state organisations such as churches also have their exactions, 22 these are more than overshadowed by the diverse demands of the state. The 'unity and reconciliation' activities are also couched in the language of umusanzu, whereby 'chaque doit donner sa contribution' 23 (everyone should make their contribution).
The RPF structure is unquestionably the most widespread and effective fundraising mechanism in Rwanda. It is a gutwerera writ large. Gutwerera is the process of raising money from family, friends and the wider community (including co-workers) to pay for a wedding, the financing of which is seen not as a 'private' but 'community' responsibility.
If the RPF is the umuryango, then elections are the perfect occasion for the political gutwerera. Trying to explain the intricate reach of the party, an informant tells me that 'all they [RPF] need is money':
For parliamentary elections, every government employee, or let's say RPF member, was forced to contribute a third of his salary. If you don't have a job, [there is] still something to contribute, they fix a minimum contribution. For next year [2010] , each employee who is a member of the RPF will contribute half of their salary, that is 125,000 RwF [$US 220]. But every month I also contribute 5,000 RwF to the party, that means every year the contribution to the party is 60,000
RwF. 24 
The lateral structure: multiple responsibilities and indirect control
But there is more to the 'dense' administrative apparatus. First, the state achieves control of the whole machinery through cooptation of multiple people into its 'responsibilities'.
The whole thing is copied from Mao Tse Tung. In my umudugudu, there are 235 families, 3 people in charge of mutuelle de santé, 5 on official committee, 3 in community policing, 3 in gender based violence committee, 5 in imihigo committee, I am one of them, 5 education officers, there is also hygiene people responsible for that …. there is a minimum of 50 people responsible for something. This is a way of ensuring …you can't have any 'opening', [space for] opposition there. In Tung's China, the idea was to have two thirds of people busy with different responsibilities.
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At the cell level, responsibilities multiply further: there are youth representatives, ubudehe committees [referring to 'tradition' of 'mutual assistance'], and more. 'But was not this administrative structure there before?' 'It was there, but we didn't have all those small committees, commissions … that makes it effective and efficient.' Indeed, responsibilities as well as activities have exploded in the past decade. Institutions such as imihigo performance contracts, ubudehe 'self-help' committees, itorero schools (described as 'advanced ingando') and their administrative structures being recently added to the mix.
To 'cooptation through responsibility' should be added the system of lateral (as opposed to simply hierarchical or vertical) controls, whereby there is an 'eye on everybody'. The itorero school graduates, along with local teachers, for example, are part of a 'consultative group' at the cell level. Itoreros and teachers both have 'their own identity, their structures, their priorities on which they are required to report', but they also 'advise the executive committee'. They have 'legal power to give ideas to the cell, and to be an eye on the executive secretary for example '. 26 At the Muhazi ingando camp for child ex-combatants, the administrator has established a complex indirect system of rule, a society apart from society, where he is the sovereign. His pupils discipline themselves through a carefully constructed political governance system, which includes a leader (duvaye) and a disciplinarian as well as a 'gacaca' court to resolve disputes. The children are separated into 'sectors' with rotating duties. Most importantly, 'everybody has an eye on his fellow … even the leader is looking [at] gacaca; gacaca is watching the leader, everyone is watching their fellow.' 27 As this makes clear, the state system creates indirect control through widespread and locally embedded webs of administration, and through cooptation of multiple people into its ranks. To break possible dissent and mobilisation, the system offers a number of the dispossessed and disempowered just a little authority over the rest. But it is really the acceptance (even if unwilling) of the 'role' that transforms, not necessarily the possession of more power.
Imihigo performance contracts: incorporating family and individual into the state structure
The recently introduced imihigo contracts also reflect the increasing permeation of We should be looking at how to stretch these performance contracts across all boundaries. They should not only be a thing for the public sector. It could take the form of private, public What are the effects of Imihigo? First, through Imihigo, families are effectively incorporated into the administrative hierarchy, and come to form its 'smallest administrative unit' (NTK 10.11.2008) . Effectively though, all individuals are meant to make their 'contribution'. Second, imihigo is a top-down mechanism of control. It not only further strengthens surveillance, but is also a mechanism for measuring alignment with government policies. Local authorities have to 'guide' residents not only to 'embrace' the idea of imihigo (ibid.), but also to embrace the policies that are promoted through it (such as 100% enrolment in mutuelle de santé scheme), and the labour that leads to achievement of some of the goals.
The pressure to achieve goals can result in coercion. 'If [imihigo] targets are not met, district authorities can expect their careers to be negatively affected. Not surprisingly therefore, local authorities use measures such as fines and destruction of property to ensure targets are met' (Huggins 2009: 299) . Another report states that 'households that failed to meet their performance targets were fined and could be imprisoned for nonpayment at local detention centres called cachots' (Thomson 2008: 8) . 'In an independent survey commissioned by the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) from mid-2007, more than half of the respondents confirmed some form of compulsion had been used to achieve the imihigo targets' (Huggins 2009: 299) .
In this context, achievement of a target, whether in form of a quantity or a deadline, becomes more important than quality of output: the imihigo for gacaca at district and sector levels was that it would finish by 2007. 'Such a target', suggests a PRI report In addition, rather than promoting local priorities as it claims, imihigo assures mainstreaming at all levels into the national development plan. 'I thought it [imihigo] was a way to improve the coherence of the planning process, national and local interests, but within the first months it became clear that government promoted the national, not the local priorities.' 30 While my informant agreed that the activity does promote 'some kind of local decision-making', often what results is a plan to please the centre: 'The mayor on his own is able to raise 20%, maybe 30% of his budget, the rest comes from the ministries, so of course he thinks "I will look at the priorities [of ministries], and will persuade my people these are their own priorities"'. 31
Decentralisation: dispatching of control?
Based on above, it appears the state system effectively 'dispatches' rather than 'decentralises' control. The latter would suggest that the centre loses some of its hold, but what we witness is not devolution of power to conceive and decide, just the devolution of implementation. Sprawling administration, multiple responsibilities and imihigo, in the final balance, do not point to decentralisation of power, but rather to dispatching of power through which, sure enough, control becomes more effective and compliance increases.
The effects are the exact opposite to the discourse: not only has 'decentralisation' not led to democratisation, but it has also directly strengthened authoritarian rule. This brings to mind Habyarimana's aim to transform the communes into 'motors of development' (Uvin 1998: 24) . The attempt meant that 'after years of work, communal development projects served to allow the burgomestres to better control their population' (' (Voyame et al. 1996 , 1999 , in Uvin 1998 'mobilisation', education and re-education will not be studied here. Suffice it to say that for this flow, the administrative system proves a highly useful 'irrigation' scheme. The focus here is instead on the bottom-up system of information gathering.
The state dispatches control not only by creating a widespread network of indirect rule, but also through its network of 'eyes and ears' that is much more 'present' on a daily basis. Both public and some private interaction are monitored. 'There are some reports that the government monitored homes and telephone calls' (US DOS 2008: 10).
During the November 2008 state-organised protests, MTN sent everyone the same messages in Kinyarwanda, urging people to gather at specific places and times. The US government has also allegedly sold Rwanda an email tracking system, which has been misused by the government to check on its critics/opponents and other 'suspicious' individuals (source?).
Regarding informers (i.e. authorities' spies), 'they are almost everywhere. [They] work closely with the police, intelligence and the army. to the current penetrating party-state? The reason why it makes sense to ask the above questions in Rwanda is that the intricate and penetrating state system has been wholly (and increasingly) captured by a specific party with an ideology that aims no less than to transform the society from above. In this goal, the state aims at 'totality' of influence.
The state's aspiration is not to annihilate non-state organised life (church sermons, selfhelp groups, lunch discussions), but rather to have a degree of control and influence over all of these forms. Importantly, this is not an attempt to discuss 'civil society', an ambiguous, highly Europe-indigenous term (Mbembe 2001; Uvin 1998) . Even if we adopt a clear proxy, associational density, we find that in Rwanda 'dense associational fabric' did not prevent fast disintegration of society in genocide (Uvin 1998: 163-79) , and on the other hand clearly proved an ineffective bulwark against the extreme asset that the state proved to be. This is because the mere existence of NGOs and other formal or informal groupings does not highlight how government fundamentally moulds these, by attacking them for perceived dissention, or urging them to cooperate in the work of the state.
With regard to suppression of the non-state, the Rwandan government operates multiple strategies of curbing opposition and managing dissent. The result is a welldocumented and general restriction on 'groupness' 53 (e.g. political parties, media outlets, but also cultural and human rights organisations that can be and have been attacked as 'divisionist'). With regard to cooperation with the state, imihigo contracts are perhaps the best formal demonstration of this phenomenon. They are applied both horizontally and vertically, targeting all possible non-state spheres including the family and the private sector. 54 'Opposition', 'dissent', or simply 'unofficial scripts' from which alternative groupness might arise, certainly do exist in their many shades. There are also bulwarks that are more institutionalised or organised than mere 'critique', 'apathy' or 'avoidance'.
In a semi-organised but underground form, a bulwark against the state exists in the Hutu 'conspiracy of silence' in gacaca (Rettig 2008) . In addition, personal networks offer a fluid and informal bulwark against the state. People of mixed background, whose affiliations cross ethnicities, are a good example of this phenomenon. While their background exposes them to distrust and even government persecution, they may at the same time get potentially life-saving information on time from an old acquaintance within the RPF establishment. 55 Despite these and other dynamics that can 'undo' the state, the increasing permeation of the state into all aspects of life reflects the preoccupation with assuring alignment. As a result of this dynamic, neither religious organisations, schools, nor associations or even private sector and the family escape the state's reach. Some of these certainly constitute an alternative source of authority, attention and ideology, but they cannot openly oppose and often are urged to align with and assist the state. 53. 'Groupness' (Brubaker 2004 ) is the ability and degree to which a collectivity can assume a corporate dimension, be effectively communicating, mutually interacting, and acting on its corporate goals.
54. People question whether there is a 'private' sector at all. Most lucrative businesses are said to belong de facto to the party (are controlled by it) (see Willum 2001: 115) , and the private sector federation chairman is a political appointee.
55. This repeatedly occurred in a US asylum case (of a Rwandan national) I worked on in 2009.
